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STATUTORY CoNsTRucnoN-ExrnA-TERRIToRIAL APPLICATION oF FEDERAL
STATUTES-APPLICATION OF.FEDERAL ToRT CLAIMs

ACT1 To CLAIMS ArusING IN

FoREIGN AlmAs LEAsED TO THB UNITED STATEs-Decedent, an airlines employee,
was killed in a plane crash at Harmon Field, Newfoundland, a base leased to the
United States by Great Britain for ninety-nine years.2 ·The plaintiff, decedent's
administratrix, brought suit in a district court against the United States, relying
on the Federal Tort Claims Act as a waiver of federal immunity from suit.
Judgment for the United States was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 3 On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. The claim arose in a foreign
country and the FTCA specifically retains federal immunity from suit on such
claims.4 United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 70 S.Ct. IO (1949).
The principal case is the latest of three recent decisions by the Supreme Court
involving the question, did Congress intend to make a federal statute applicable
to events occurring in areas not subject to the sovereignty of the United States? 5
The first of them, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 6 involved a suit by employees
for additional compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act;7 the services in
question had been rendered on the Bermuda base leased by Great Britain to the
United States for ninety-nine years. 8 The applicability of the FLSA to this
employment turned on whether this base was a "possession" of the United States

62 Stat. L. 982, c. 171 (1948), 28 U.S.C., c. 20.
This is one of the bases leased to the United States in exchange for 50 over-age destroyers pursuant to Executive Agreement of March 27, 1941, 55 Stat. L. 1560, 1572, 1574,
1590 (1941).
s (2d Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 208.
4 62 Stat. L. 985, §2680(k) (1948), 28 U.S.C. §943(k).
5 In all three of these cases, the Court held that Congress had legislative power to act
beyond the limits of United States sovereignty with respect to the matters involved.
6 335 U.S. 377, 69 S.Ct. 140 (1948).
7 52 Stat. L. 1060-1069, c. 676 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§201-219.
8 This lease was executed pursuant to the Executive Agreement referred to in note 2,
supra.
1
2
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within the meaning of the FLSA.9 Making no reference whatever to presumptive
limits on the territorial application of federal statutes, the majority of the Court
held that Congress, in using the term "possessions" in the FLSA, would have
intended to include the leased base within that term had the matter then been
considered. Thus the Court held that the term "possession" might include areas
not subject to the sovereignty of the United States,1° necessarily implying that a
case by case analysis of statut~ employing this term as a territorial limitation would
be necessary to determine Congressional intent.11 It is not unfair to say that the
evidence relied on by the majority as demonstrating this Congressional intent was
something less than conclusive,12 the uncertainty being increased by the fact that
9 The FLSA applies to employees engaged in commerce, " .•. among the several States
or from any State to any place outside thereof," and defines state as meaning, " .•. any State
of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United
States." 52 Stat. L. 1060, §§3(b), 3(c) (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§3(b), 3(c). Although the
Court's opinion is not clear on the matter, it is believed that the decision assumes that commerce between a state and a possession of the United States was involved, for otherwise,
barring a possibility discussed below, it is difficult to see how the question of defining the term
"possession" would have been relevant. One may fairly ask why the Court undertook to
define the term possession when it could, consistently with the literal language of the statute
and the evidence, have reached the conclusion that commerce between a state and a "place
outside thereof," viz., the Bermuda base, was involved? While the Supreme Court's several
opinions do not refer in terms to this possibility, reference to the transcript of record before
the Supreme Court reveals that it was raised on pages 5 and 6 of plaintiffs' (respondents')
brief, and that a rather exhaustive answer was made in the brief for the United States filed
amicus curiae, pages 40 et seq. Perhaps the Supreme Court accepted the argument of the
United States, which in part was as follows: (1) the phrase "from any State to any place
outside thereof" was inserted by Congress to bring within the FLSA those employees who
were engaged, within a state as defined in the FLSA, in commerce between such state and a
foreign country; (2) hence the phrase must· be considered as referring only to employees
engaged in commerce within a state as defined in the FLSA; (3) hence, from this view of
the case also, we must decide whether the Bermuda base was a state as defined in the FLSA,
and the only possibility is that it falls within that definition because it is a possession of the
United States.
·
·
lOVermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra, note 6, at 386. By so doing, the majority was
able to avoid the argument, adopted by the district court in this case, [(D.C. N.Y. 1946) 73
F. Supp. 860 at 861] that the applicability of the FLSA depended upon a political question
of the existence of sovereignty, and therefore that the ruling of the executive branch of the
government [39 OP. Am. G:aN. 484 at 485 (1941)] to the effect that sovereignty over the
leased areas remained in.Great Britain, necessarily determined that the FLSA did not apply
to the Bermuda base.
11 In footnote 11 to his dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson listed a great number ·of
federal statutes employing this term as a territorial limitation, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
supra, note 6, at 398.
·
12 The court makes reference to more or less analogous areas held by the United States
under varying degrees of control at the date of enactment of the FLSA, June 25, 1938, but
fails to demonstrate Congressional intention to make the FLSA applicable to the areas referred
to. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra, note 6, at 383-85. Next the Court makes the
negative argument that administrative rulings had made the FLSA applicable to such possessions as Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which areas had economies
differing greatly from that of the continental United States, thus showing that Congress need
not have intended to exclude these leased bases from the FLSA because of differences in
domestic economy. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra, note 6 at 388. Then the Court
pointed out that, since the enactment of the FLSA, Congress had extended the benefits of
other labor legislation to bases acquired since January 1, 1940, but no definite conclusions
are attempted by the Court after making this reference.
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the FLSA was enacted'before these leased bases were even contemplated. 13 Apparently, the factor relied upon most heavily by the Court was the general notion
that the FLSA was desirable legislation which Congress would naturally desire
to apply broadly;14 but this is indeed a hazy concept, for Congress presumably
approves of all general legislation which it enacts. The second case, Foley Bros.
11. Filardo,1 5 involved another employee's suit for additional compensation, this
time by a cook employed by a government contractor at a United States base in
Iran, an area not subject to a leasehold in favor of the United States. The basis
of suit was the so-called Eight Hour Law,16 requiring additional compensation for
work in excess of eight hours per day. Here the crucial question was whether
statutory language making the statute applicable to employment under "every
contract •.."17 let by the United States, indicated Congressional intent to extend
the benefits of the statute to this Iran employment. The Court's answer was no,
and the general rationale of decision offered was the proposition that, unless
Congress expresses a contrary intent, it will be presumed that the statute was
intended to apply only within the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States,18
the Court concluding that Iran was not such an area. It is suggested that this
decision exhibits two noteworthy features. Initially, the Court goes beyond the
literal "every contract" language of the statute to avoid applying it to this extrasovereign area, while in the Vermilya case the Court labored somewhat to achieve
the opposite result on the basis of language offering less literal justification than
that of the Foley case.19 Is it not a possibility that the Court's ardor for broad
territorial application of labor legislation had cooled somewhat since the Vermilya
case? Secondly, we find the Court in the Foley case resorting to a general presumption against Congressional intent to make federal statutes applicable beyond
the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States, an approach conspicuous by its
absence in the Vermilya cas·e. We must add a caveat to this presumption, however,
namely, what does the term "territorial jurisdiction" mean? Two earlier Supreme
Court decisions, one of which was considered by the Court in the Foley case,
suggest when read together that "territorial jurisdiction" and areas subject to
"sovereignty" are geographically co-extensive terms. 20 On the other hand, after
13 The FLSA was enacted on June 25, 1938; the Executive Agreement resulting :in the
lease of the Bermuda base was executed on March 27, 1941.
14 The majority opinion stresses the general purpose of the FLSA to improve labor conditions on three separate occasions. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra, note 6, at 387
(including footnote 13 on that page), 389 and 390 (the final sentence of the Court's opinion
on page 390 stresses the remedial purpose of the FLSA).
15 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949). For a discussion of this case, see note, 47 MicH.
L. R.Ev. 1230 (1949).
16 27 Stat. L. 340, §1 (1892), as amended by 37 Stat. L. 137, c. 174 (1912) and 54
Stat. L. 884, §303 (1940), 40 U.S.C.A. §§321-326.
1 7 27 Stat. L. 340, §l (1892), as amended by 37 Stat. L. 137, c. 174, 40 U.S.C.A. §324.
18 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, supra, note 15, at 285.
19 It is not suggested that the Court's reference to legislative history was not convincing.
See the discussion in Foley Bros. v. Filardo, supra, note 15, at 287-288.
20 The opinion in the Foley case cites Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 at 437,
52 S.Ct. 252 (1931); the Blackmer case in turn cites American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 at 357, 29 S.Ct. 511 (1909).
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stating the territorial jurisdiction presumption, the Foley opinion uses language
negatively suggesting that areas subject to United States "territorial jurisdiction"
are not necessarily subject to United States sovereignty.21 The formal reasoning
of the principal case is, in the language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion,
". . . mechanical jurisprudence at its best."22 The application of the FfCA to
plaintiff's suit turned on the question of whether the Newfoundland ninety-nine
year lease base was a "foreign country" within the meaning of the FfCA which
excluded claims arising therein. The answer given was yes, because a foreign
country was one subject to foreign sovereignty, and the Vermilya case had declared·
these leased areas to be subject to British sovereignty.28 But perhaps the most
significant feature of the principal case was the reliance of the majority opinion
,on the presumption stated in the Foley case, that Congress presumptively intended
federal statutes to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.24 Clearly, the majority viewed the Newfoundland base as being outside
of United States territorial jurisdiction, and this view is significant for two reasons.
First, it further defines what the Court means by that term; at least, the presumption against application of federal statutes now·extends to leased bases over
which the United States does not have sovereignty. Secondly, in this respect
the principal case seems directly contra to the Vermilya case, which totally ignored
any such presumption in dealing with another of these leased areas. It is probably
too early to state that the Vermilya case, with its broad implications of applying
statutes territorially on a basis of presumed Congressional fondness for the statutory
purpose, is limited to its facts. But it seems clear that the Supreme Court, in the
Foley case and the principal case, is retreating toward a presumption that Congress
did not intend to make federal statutes applicable beyond the geographic limits
of United States sovereignty; indeed, it is possible that the Court has already
arrived at such a position.25

Thomas L. Waterbury, S.Ed.

21 ''There is no language in the Eight Hour Law here in question that gives any indication of congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United
States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislam,e control." 336 U.S. 281 at 285, 69
S.Ct. 575 (1949). Italics supplied.
22 Principal case at 223.
28 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra, note 6, at 380.
24 Principal case at 222. Although this ~ g e appears at the end of the majority
opinion, it can fairly be read as declaring the presumption to be tlie actual basis of the decision in the principal case.
26 I£ the Comt wishes to reach this conclusion, it may :resort to language used in the
majority opinion in the Vermilya case, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supxa, note 6, at 381;
which can be :read as equating "territorial jurisdiction" and "sovereignty."

